security/manager/ssl/src/CertVerifier.cpp
author Camilo Viecco <cviecco@mozilla.com>
Mon, 21 Oct 2013 14:27:46 -0700
changeset 167594 986074bde47dd276518ba73794a85a11d0999131
parent 167464 bf6158f1ffc81ff0b2f806c570121e39095ddb31
permissions -rw-r--r--
Bug 917380 - Part 1 - Add filters for EV root list. r=briansmith a=abilings

/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

#include "CertVerifier.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "secerr.h"


#ifdef PR_LOGGING
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
#endif

namespace mozilla { namespace psm {

extern SECStatus getFirstEVPolicy(CERTCertificate *cert, SECOidTag &outOidTag);
extern CERTCertList* getRootsForOid(SECOidTag oid_tag);

const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY = 1;

CertVerifier::CertVerifier(missing_cert_download_config mcdc,
                           crl_download_config cdc,
                           ocsp_download_config odc,
                           ocsp_strict_config osc,
                           any_revo_fresh_config arfc,
                           const char *firstNetworkRevocationMethod,
                           ocsp_get_config ogc)
  : mMissingCertDownloadEnabled(mcdc == missing_cert_download_on)
  , mCRLDownloadEnabled(cdc == crl_download_allowed)
  , mOCSPDownloadEnabled(odc == ocsp_on)
  , mOCSPStrict(osc == ocsp_strict)
  , mRequireRevocationInfo(arfc == any_revo_strict)
  , mCRLFirst(firstNetworkRevocationMethod != nullptr &&
              !strcmp("crl", firstNetworkRevocationMethod))
  , mOCSPGETEnabled(ogc == ocsp_get_enabled)
{
  MOZ_COUNT_CTOR(CertVerifier);
}

CertVerifier::~CertVerifier()
{
  MOZ_COUNT_DTOR(CertVerifier);
}


static SECStatus
ClassicVerifyCert(CERTCertificate * cert,
                  const SECCertificateUsage usage,
                  const PRTime time,
                  nsIInterfaceRequestor * pinArg,
                  /*optional out*/ CERTCertList **validationChain,
                  /*optional out*/ CERTVerifyLog *verifyLog)
{
  SECStatus rv;
  SECCertUsage enumUsage;
  if (validationChain) {
    switch(usage){
      case  certificateUsageSSLClient:
        enumUsage = certUsageSSLClient;
        break;
      case  certificateUsageSSLServer:
        enumUsage = certUsageSSLServer;
        break;
      case certificateUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
        enumUsage = certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp;
        break;
      case certificateUsageSSLCA:
        enumUsage = certUsageSSLCA;
        break;
      case certificateUsageEmailSigner:
        enumUsage = certUsageEmailSigner;
        break;
      case certificateUsageEmailRecipient:
        enumUsage = certUsageEmailRecipient;
        break;
      case certificateUsageObjectSigner:
        enumUsage = certUsageObjectSigner;
        break;
      case certificateUsageUserCertImport:
        enumUsage = certUsageUserCertImport;
        break;
      case certificateUsageVerifyCA:
        enumUsage = certUsageVerifyCA;
        break;
      case certificateUsageProtectedObjectSigner:
        enumUsage = certUsageProtectedObjectSigner;
        break;
      case certificateUsageStatusResponder:
        enumUsage = certUsageStatusResponder;
        break;
      case certificateUsageAnyCA:
        enumUsage = certUsageAnyCA;
        break;
       default:
        return SECFailure;
    }
  }
  if (usage == certificateUsageSSLServer) {
    /* SSL server cert verification has always used CERT_VerifyCert, so we
     * continue to use it for SSL cert verification to minimize the risk of
     * there being any differnce in results between CERT_VerifyCert and
     * CERT_VerifyCertificate.
     */
    rv = CERT_VerifyCert(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), cert, true,
                         certUsageSSLServer, time, pinArg, verifyLog);
  } else {
    rv = CERT_VerifyCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), cert, true,
                                usage, time, pinArg,
                                verifyLog, nullptr);
  }
  if (rv == SECSuccess && validationChain) {
    PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: getting chain in 'classic' \n"));
    *validationChain = CERT_GetCertChainFromCert(cert, time, enumUsage);
    if (!*validationChain) {
      rv = SECFailure;
    }
  }
  return rv;
}

SECStatus
CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate * cert,
                         const SECCertificateUsage usage,
                         const PRTime time,
                         nsIInterfaceRequestor * pinArg,
                         const Flags flags,
                         /*optional out*/ CERTCertList **validationChain,
                         /*optional out*/ SECOidTag *evOidPolicy,
                         /*optional out*/ CERTVerifyLog *verifyLog)
{
  if (!cert) {
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
    return SECFailure;
  }
  if (validationChain) {
    *validationChain = nullptr;
  }
  if (evOidPolicy) {
    *evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
  }

  ScopedCERTCertList trustAnchors;
  SECStatus rv;
  SECOidTag evPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;

#ifdef NSS_NO_LIBPKIX
  return ClassicVerifyCert(cert, usage, time, pinArg, validationChain,
                           verifyLog);
#else
  // Do EV checking only for sslserver usage
  if (usage == certificateUsageSSLServer) {
    SECStatus srv = getFirstEVPolicy(cert, evPolicy);
    if (srv == SECSuccess) {
      if (evPolicy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
        trustAnchors = getRootsForOid(evPolicy);
      }
      if (!trustAnchors) {
        return SECFailure;
      }
      // pkix ignores an empty trustanchors list and
      // decides then to use the whole set of trust in the DB
      // so we set the evPolicy to unkown in this case
      if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(trustAnchors)) {
        evPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
      }
    } else {
      // Do not setup EV verification params
      evPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
    }
  }
  
  MOZ_ASSERT_IF(evPolicy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, trustAnchors);

  size_t i = 0;
  size_t validationChainLocation = 0;
  size_t validationTrustAnchorLocation = 0;
  CERTValOutParam cvout[4];
  if (verifyLog) {
     cvout[i].type = cert_po_errorLog;
     cvout[i].value.pointer.log = verifyLog;
     ++i;
  }
  if (validationChain) {
    PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: setting up validation chain outparam.\n"));
    validationChainLocation = i;
    cvout[i].type = cert_po_certList;
    cvout[i].value.pointer.cert = nullptr;
    ++i;
    validationTrustAnchorLocation = i;
    cvout[i].type = cert_po_trustAnchor;
    cvout[i].value.pointer.chain = nullptr;
    ++i;
  }
  cvout[i].type = cert_po_end;

  CERTRevocationFlags rev;

  CERTRevocationMethodIndex revPreferredMethods[2];
  rev.leafTests.preferred_methods =
  rev.chainTests.preferred_methods = revPreferredMethods;

  uint64_t revFlagsPerMethod[2];
  rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method =
  rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = revFlagsPerMethod;
  rev.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
  rev.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods = 1;

  rev.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods =
  rev.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods = cert_revocation_method_ocsp + 1;

  const bool localOnly = flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY;
  CERTValInParam cvin[6];

  // Parameters for both EV and DV validation
  cvin[0].type = cert_pi_useAIACertFetch;
  cvin[0].value.scalar.b = mMissingCertDownloadEnabled && !localOnly;
  cvin[1].type = cert_pi_revocationFlags;
  cvin[1].value.pointer.revocation = &rev;
  cvin[2].type = cert_pi_date;
  cvin[2].value.scalar.time = time;
  i = 3;
  const size_t evParamLocation = i;

  if (evPolicy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
    // EV setup!
    // XXX 859872 The current flags are not quite correct. (use
    // of ocsp flags for crl preferences).
    uint64_t revMethodFlags =
      CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD
      | ((mOCSPDownloadEnabled && !localOnly) ?
          CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING : CERT_REV_M_FORBID_NETWORK_FETCHING)
      | CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE
      | CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE
      | CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO
      | CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO;
 
    rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl] =
    rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revMethodFlags;

    rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] =
    rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp]
      = revMethodFlags
      | (mOCSPGETEnabled ? 0 : CERT_REV_M_FORCE_POST_METHOD_FOR_OCSP);

    rev.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
    rev.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
      // avoiding the network is good, let's try local first
      CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST
      // is overall revocation requirement strict or relaxed?
      |  CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE
      ;

    rev.leafTests.preferred_methods[0] =
    rev.chainTests.preferred_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp;

    cvin[i].type = cert_pi_policyOID;
    cvin[i].value.arraySize = 1;
    cvin[i].value.array.oids = &evPolicy;
    ++i;
    MOZ_ASSERT(trustAnchors);
    cvin[i].type = cert_pi_trustAnchors;
    cvin[i].value.pointer.chain = trustAnchors;
    ++i;

    cvin[i].type = cert_pi_end;

    rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert, usage, cvin, cvout, pinArg);
    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
      if (evOidPolicy) {
        *evOidPolicy = evPolicy;
      }
      PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
             ("VerifyCert: successful CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(ev) \n"));
      goto pkix_done;
    }

    if (validationChain && *validationChain) {
      // There SHOULD not be a validation chain on failure, asserion here for
      // the debug builds AND a fallback for production builds
      MOZ_ASSERT(false,
                 "certPKIXVerifyCert returned failure AND a validationChain");
      CERT_DestroyCertList(*validationChain);
      *validationChain = nullptr;
    }

    if (verifyLog) {
      // Cleanup the log so that it is ready the the next validation
      CERTVerifyLogNode *i_node;
      for (i_node = verifyLog->head; i_node; i_node = i_node->next) {
         //destroy cert if any.
         if (i_node->cert) {
           CERT_DestroyCertificate(i_node->cert);
         }
         // No need to cleanup the actual nodes in the arena.
      }
      verifyLog->count = 0;
      verifyLog->head = nullptr;
      verifyLog->tail = nullptr;
    }

  }

  if (!nsNSSComponent::globalConstFlagUsePKIXVerification){
    // XXX: we do not care about the localOnly flag (currently) as the
    // caller that wants localOnly should disable and reenable the fetching.
    return ClassicVerifyCert(cert, usage, time, pinArg, validationChain,
                             verifyLog);
  }

  // The current flags check the chain the same way as the leafs
  rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl] =
  rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl] =
    // implicit default source - makes no sense for CRLs
    CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE

    // let's not stop on fresh CRL. If OCSP is enabled, too, let's check it
    | CERT_REV_M_CONTINUE_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO

    // no fresh CRL? well, let other flag decide whether to fail or not
    | CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO

    // testing using local CRLs is always allowed
    | CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD

    // no local crl and don't know where to get it from? ignore
    | CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE

    // crl download based on parameter
    | ((mCRLDownloadEnabled && !localOnly) ?
        CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING : CERT_REV_M_FORBID_NETWORK_FETCHING)
    ;

  rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] =
  rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] =
    // use OCSP
      CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD

    // if app has a default OCSP responder configured, let's use it
    | CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE

    // of course OCSP doesn't work without a source. let's accept such certs
    | CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE

    // if ocsp is required stop on lack of freshness
    | (mOCSPStrict ?
       CERT_REV_M_FAIL_ON_MISSING_FRESH_INFO : CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO)

    // ocsp success is sufficient
    | CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO

    // ocsp enabled controls network fetching, too
    | ((mOCSPDownloadEnabled && !localOnly) ?
        CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING : CERT_REV_M_FORBID_NETWORK_FETCHING)
    
    | (mOCSPGETEnabled ? 0 : CERT_REV_M_FORCE_POST_METHOD_FOR_OCSP);
    ;

  rev.leafTests.preferred_methods[0] =
  rev.chainTests.preferred_methods[0] =
    mCRLFirst ? cert_revocation_method_crl : cert_revocation_method_ocsp;

  rev.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
  rev.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
    // avoiding the network is good, let's try local first
    CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST

    // is overall revocation requirement strict or relaxed?
    | (mRequireRevocationInfo ?
       CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE : CERT_REV_MI_NO_OVERALL_INFO_REQUIREMENT)
    ;

  // Skip EV parameters
  cvin[evParamLocation].type = cert_pi_end;

  PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: calling CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(dv) \n"));
  rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert, usage, cvin, cvout, pinArg);

pkix_done:
  if (validationChain) {
    PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: validation chain requested\n"));
    ScopedCERTCertificate trustAnchor(cvout[validationTrustAnchorLocation].value.pointer.cert);

    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
      if (! cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain) {
        PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0);
        return SECFailure;
      }
      PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: I have a chain\n"));
      *validationChain = cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain;
      if (trustAnchor) {
        // we should only add the issuer to the chain if it is not already
        // present. On CA cert checking, the issuer is the same cert, so in
        // that case we do not add the cert to the chain.
        if (!CERT_CompareCerts(trustAnchor, cert)) {
          PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert:  adding issuer to tail for display\n"));
          // note: rv is reused to catch errors on cert creation!
          ScopedCERTCertificate tempCert(CERT_DupCertificate(trustAnchor));
          rv = CERT_AddCertToListTail(*validationChain, tempCert);
          if (rv == SECSuccess) {
            tempCert.forget(); // ownership traferred to validationChain
          } else {
            CERT_DestroyCertList(*validationChain);
            *validationChain = nullptr;
          }
        }
      }
    } else {
      // Validation was a fail, clean up if needed
      if (cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain) {
        CERT_DestroyCertList(cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain);
      }
    }
  }

  return rv;
#endif
}

TemporaryRef<CertVerifier>
GetDefaultCertVerifier()
{
  static NS_DEFINE_CID(kNSSComponentCID, NS_NSSCOMPONENT_CID);

  nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> nssComponent(do_GetService(kNSSComponentCID));
  RefPtr<CertVerifier> certVerifier;
  if (nssComponent) {
    (void) nssComponent->GetDefaultCertVerifier(certVerifier);
  }
  return certVerifier;
}

} } // namespace mozilla::psm