security/certverifier/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp
author Kershaw Chang <kechang@mozilla.com>
Thu, 27 Jul 2017 23:41:00 +0200
changeset 420412 43a17f4d5399bcca8f67b3756aadf670792873d2
parent 369894 adf193b5d6c9ce92b05a9370e8b4a5699bae537a
child 475080 b54db66223586b4e04f5cb926fccdacf8a176b91
permissions -rw-r--r--
Bug 1366822 - Part1: Modify NetworkPrioritizer to only update selected tab's window ID, r=dao The original NetworkPrioritizer tracks each browser window and give the high priority to the selected tab. This patch is based on the NetworkPrioritizer, but only send a notification of the current selected tab's content outer window ID to network module.

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

#include "MultiLogCTVerifier.h"

#include "CTObjectsExtractor.h"
#include "CTSerialization.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Move.h"

namespace mozilla { namespace ct {

using namespace mozilla::pkix;

// Note: this moves |verifiedSct| to the target list in |result|.
static Result
StoreVerifiedSct(CTVerifyResult& result,
                 VerifiedSCT&& verifiedSct,
                 VerifiedSCT::Status status)
{
  verifiedSct.status = status;
  if (!result.verifiedScts.append(Move(verifiedSct))) {
    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
  }
  return Success;
}

Result
MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(CTLogVerifier&& log)
{
  if (!mLogs.append(Move(log))) {
    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
  }
  return Success;
}

Result
MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(Input cert,
                           Input issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo,
                           Input sctListFromCert,
                           Input sctListFromOCSPResponse,
                           Input sctListFromTLSExtension,
                           Time time,
                           CTVerifyResult& result)
{
  MOZ_ASSERT(cert.GetLength() > 0);
  result.Reset();

  Result rv;

  // Verify embedded SCTs
  if (issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo.GetLength() > 0 &&
      sctListFromCert.GetLength() > 0) {
    LogEntry precertEntry;
    rv = GetPrecertLogEntry(cert, issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo, precertEntry);
    if (rv != Success) {
      return rv;
    }
    rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromCert, precertEntry,
                    VerifiedSCT::Origin::Embedded, time, result);
    if (rv != Success) {
      return rv;
    }
  }

  LogEntry x509Entry;
  rv = GetX509LogEntry(cert, x509Entry);
  if (rv != Success) {
    return rv;
  }

  // Verify SCTs from a stapled OCSP response
  if (sctListFromOCSPResponse.GetLength() > 0) {
    rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromOCSPResponse, x509Entry,
                    VerifiedSCT::Origin::OCSPResponse, time, result);
    if (rv != Success) {
      return rv;
    }
  }

  // Verify SCTs from a TLS extension
  if (sctListFromTLSExtension.GetLength() > 0) {
    rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromTLSExtension, x509Entry,
                    VerifiedSCT::Origin::TLSExtension, time, result);
    if (rv != Success) {
      return rv;
    }
  }
  return Success;
}

Result
MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(Input encodedSctList,
                               const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
                               VerifiedSCT::Origin origin,
                               Time time,
                               CTVerifyResult& result)
{
  Reader listReader;
  Result rv = DecodeSCTList(encodedSctList, listReader);
  if (rv != Success) {
    result.decodingErrors++;
    return Success;
  }

  while (!listReader.AtEnd()) {
    Input encodedSct;
    rv = ReadSCTListItem(listReader, encodedSct);
    if (rv != Success) {
      result.decodingErrors++;
      return Success;
    }

    Reader encodedSctReader(encodedSct);
    SignedCertificateTimestamp sct;
    rv = DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(encodedSctReader, sct);
    if (rv != Success) {
      result.decodingErrors++;
      continue;
    }

    rv = VerifySingleSCT(Move(sct), expectedEntry, origin, time, result);
    if (rv != Success) {
      return rv;
    }
  }
  return Success;
}

Result
MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct,
                                    const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
                                    VerifiedSCT::Origin origin,
                                    Time time,
                                    CTVerifyResult& result)
{
  VerifiedSCT verifiedSct;
  verifiedSct.origin = origin;
  verifiedSct.sct = Move(sct);

  CTLogVerifier* matchingLog = nullptr;
  for (auto& log : mLogs) {
    if (log.keyId() == verifiedSct.sct.logId) {
      matchingLog = &log;
      break;
    }
  }

  if (!matchingLog) {
    // SCT does not match any known log.
    return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(verifiedSct),
                            VerifiedSCT::Status::UnknownLog);
  }

  verifiedSct.logOperatorId = matchingLog->operatorId();

  if (!matchingLog->SignatureParametersMatch(verifiedSct.sct.signature)) {
    // SCT signature parameters do not match the log's.
    return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(verifiedSct),
                            VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidSignature);
  }

  Result rv = matchingLog->Verify(expectedEntry, verifiedSct.sct);
  if (rv != Success) {
    if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
      return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(verifiedSct),
                              VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidSignature);
    }
    return rv;
  }

  // Make sure the timestamp is legitimate (not in the future).
  // SCT's |timestamp| is measured in milliseconds since the epoch,
  // ignoring leap seconds. When converting it to a second-level precision
  // pkix::Time, we need to round it either up or down. In our case, rounding up
  // (towards the future) is more "secure", although practically
  // it does not matter.
  Time sctTime =
    TimeFromEpochInSeconds((verifiedSct.sct.timestamp + 999u) / 1000u);
  if (sctTime > time) {
    return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(verifiedSct),
                            VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidTimestamp);
  }

  // SCT verified ok, see if the log is qualified. Since SCTs from
  // disqualified logs are treated as valid under certain circumstances (see
  // the CT Policy), the log qualification check must be the last one we do.
  if (matchingLog->isDisqualified()) {
    verifiedSct.logDisqualificationTime = matchingLog->disqualificationTime();
    return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(verifiedSct),
                            VerifiedSCT::Status::ValidFromDisqualifiedLog);
  }

  return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(verifiedSct),
                          VerifiedSCT::Status::Valid);
}

} } // namespace mozilla::ct