caps/nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl
author B2G Bumper Bot <release+b2gbumper@mozilla.com>
Mon, 22 Feb 2016 03:49:17 -0800
changeset 325569 0a57b98cd14f933331868d1efdea5ec997f0511f
parent 298727 08360a185f3f0a4e74f6e2af6740f014df643af5
child 334578 c32539fd746a21ebef7f0d2e601c20ad6acd0640
permissions -rw-r--r--
Bumping gaia.json for 2 gaia revision(s) a=gaia-bump ======== https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/gaia-central/rev/e77f885e5e54 Author: Ricky Chien <rickychien@users.noreply.github.com> Desc: Merge pull request #34073 from rickychien/bug-955989 Bug 955989 - Running additional-extensions.js and download-manager.js on node.js r=@=scottwu ======== https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/gaia-central/rev/f9e8113e2739 Author: Ricky Chien <ricky060709@gmail.com> Desc: Bug 955989 - Running additional-extensions.js and download-manager.js on node.js

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

#include "nsISupports.idl"
#include "nsIPrincipal.idl"
interface nsIURI;
interface nsIChannel;
interface nsIClassInfo;
interface nsIDocShell;
interface nsIDomainPolicy;
interface nsILoadContext;

%{ C++
#include "jspubtd.h"

namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
class DomainPolicyClone;
}
}
%}

[ptr] native JSContextPtr(JSContext);
[ptr] native JSObjectPtr(JSObject);
[ptr] native DomainPolicyClonePtr(mozilla::dom::DomainPolicyClone);

[scriptable, uuid(b7ae2310-576e-11e5-a837-0800200c9a66)]
interface nsIScriptSecurityManager : nsISupports
{
    /**
     * For each of these hooks returning NS_OK means 'let the action continue'.
     * Returning an error code means 'veto the action'. XPConnect will return
     * false to the js engine if the action is vetoed. The implementor of this
     * interface is responsible for setting a JS exception into the JSContext
     * if that is appropriate.
     */
    [noscript] void canCreateWrapper(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
                                     in nsIIDRef aIID,
                                     in nsISupports aObj,
                                     in nsIClassInfo aClassInfo);

    [noscript] void canCreateInstance(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
                                      in nsCIDRef aCID);

    [noscript] void canGetService(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
                                  in nsCIDRef aCID);

    /**
     * Check that the script currently running in context "cx" can load "uri".
     *
     * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
     * should be denied.
     *
     * @param cx the JSContext of the script causing the load
     * @param uri the URI that is being loaded
     */
    [noscript] void checkLoadURIFromScript(in JSContextPtr cx, in nsIURI uri);

    /**
     * Default CheckLoadURI permissions
     */
    // Default permissions
    const unsigned long STANDARD = 0;

    // Indicate that the load is a load of a new document that is not
    // user-triggered.  Here "user-triggered" could be broadly interpreted --
    // for example, scripted sets of window.location.href might be treated as
    // "user-triggered" in some circumstances.  A typical example of a load
    // that is not user-triggered is a <meta> refresh load.  If this flag is
    // set, the load will be denied if the originating principal's URI has the
    // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT flag set.
    const unsigned long LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = 1 << 0;

    // Allow the loading of chrome URLs by non-chrome URLs.  Use with great
    // care!  This will actually allow the loading of any URI which has the
    // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE protocol handler flag set.  Ths
    // probably means at least chrome: and resource:.
    const unsigned long ALLOW_CHROME = 1 << 1;

    // Don't allow URLs which would inherit the caller's principal (such as
    // javascript: or data:) to load.  See
    // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT.
    const unsigned long DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = 1 << 2;

    // Alias for DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL for backwards compat with
    // JS-implemented extensions.
    const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;

    // Don't allow javascript: URLs to load
    //   WARNING: Support for this value was added in Mozilla 1.7.8 and
    //   Firefox 1.0.4.  Use in prior versions WILL BE IGNORED.
    // When using this, make sure that you actually want DISALLOW_SCRIPT, not
    // DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL
    const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT = 1 << 3;

    // Do not report errors if we just want to check if a principal can load
    // a URI to not unnecessarily spam the error console.
    const unsigned long DONT_REPORT_ERRORS = 1 << 4;

    /**
     * Check that content with principal aPrincipal can load "uri".
     *
     * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
     * should be denied.
     *
     * @param aPrincipal the principal identifying the actor causing the load
     * @param uri the URI that is being loaded
     * @param flags the permission set, see above
     */
    void checkLoadURIWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
                                   in nsIURI uri,
                                   in unsigned long flags);

    /**
     * Similar to checkLoadURIWithPrincipal but there are two differences:
     *
     * 1) The URI is a string, not a URI object.
     * 2) This function assumes that the URI may still be subject to fixup (and
     * hence will check whether fixed-up versions of the URI are allowed to
     * load as well); if any of the versions of this URI is not allowed, this
     * function will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI.
     */
    void checkLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
                                      in AUTF8String uri,
                                      in unsigned long flags);

    /**
     * Return true if scripts may be executed in the scope of the given global.
     */
    [noscript,notxpcom] boolean scriptAllowed(in JSObjectPtr aGlobal);

    ///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////

    /**
     * Return the all-powerful system principal.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getSystemPrincipal();

    /**
     * Return a principal that has the same origin as aURI.
     * This principals should not be used for any data/permission check, it will
     * have appId = UNKNOWN_APP_ID.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getSimpleCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI aURI);

    /**
     * Returns a principal that has the given information.
     * @param appId is the app id of the principal. It can't be UNKNOWN_APP_ID.
     * @param inMozBrowser is true if the principal has to be considered as
     * inside a mozbrowser frame.
     *
     * @deprecated use createCodebasePrincipal instead.
     */
    [deprecated] nsIPrincipal getAppCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
                                                      in unsigned long appId,
                                                      in boolean inMozBrowser);

    /**
     * Returns a principal that has the appId and inMozBrowser of the load
     * context.
     * @param loadContext to get appId/inMozBrowser from.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getLoadContextCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
                                                 in nsILoadContext loadContext);

    /**
     * Returns a principal that has the appId and inMozBrowser of the docshell
     * inside a mozbrowser frame.
     * @param docShell to get appId/inMozBrowser from.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getDocShellCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
                                              in nsIDocShell docShell);

    /**
     * Returns a principal with that has the same origin as uri and is not part
     * of an appliction.
     * The returned principal will have appId = NO_APP_ID.
     *
     * @deprecated use createCodebasePrincipal instead.
     */
    [deprecated] nsIPrincipal getNoAppCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri);

    /**
     * Legacy method for getting a principal with no origin attributes.
     *
     * @deprecated use createCodebasePrincipal instead.
     */
    [deprecated] nsIPrincipal getCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri);

    /**
     * Returns a principal whose origin is composed of |uri| and |originAttributes|.
     * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
     * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
     */
    [implicit_jscontext]
    nsIPrincipal createCodebasePrincipal(in nsIURI uri, in jsval originAttributes);

    /**
     * Returns a principal whose origin is the one we pass in.
     * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
     * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
     */
    nsIPrincipal createCodebasePrincipalFromOrigin(in ACString origin);

    /**
     * Returns a unique nonce principal with |originAttributes|.
     * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
     * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
     */
    [implicit_jscontext]
    nsIPrincipal createNullPrincipal(in jsval originAttributes);

    /**
     * Creates an expanded principal whose capabilities are the union of the
     * given principals. An expanded principal has an asymmetric privilege
     * relationship with its sub-principals (that is to say, it subsumes the
     * sub-principals, but the sub-principals do not subsume it), even if
     * there's only one. This presents a legitimate use-case for making an
     * expanded principal around a single sub-principal, which we do frequently.
     *
     * Expanded principals cannot have origin attributes themselves, but rather
     * have them through their sub-principals - so we don't accept them here.
     */
    nsIPrincipal createExpandedPrincipal([array, size_is(aLength)] in nsIPrincipal aPrincipalArray,
                                         [optional] in unsigned long aLength);

    /**
     * Returns OK if aSourceURI and target have the same "origin"
     * (scheme, host, and port).
     * ReportError flag suppresses error reports for functions that
     * don't need reporting.
     */
    void checkSameOriginURI(in nsIURI aSourceURI,
                            in nsIURI aTargetURI,
                            in boolean reportError);
    /**
     * Get the principal for the given channel.  This will typically be the
     * channel owner if there is one, and the codebase principal for the
     * channel's URI otherwise.  aChannel must not be null.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);

    /**
     * Get the codebase principal for the channel's URI.
     * aChannel must not be null.
     */
    nsIPrincipal getChannelURIPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);

    /**
     * Check whether a given principal is a system principal.  This allows us
     * to avoid handing back the system principal to script while allowing
     * script to check whether a given principal is system.
     */
    boolean isSystemPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal);
%{C++
    bool IsSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
      bool isSystem = false;
      IsSystemPrincipal(aPrincipal, &isSystem);
      return isSystem;
    }
%}

    const unsigned long NO_APP_ID = 0;
    const unsigned long UNKNOWN_APP_ID = 4294967295; // UINT32_MAX
    const unsigned long SAFEBROWSING_APP_ID = 4294967294; // UINT32_MAX - 1

    const unsigned long DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID = 0;

    /**
     * Returns the jar prefix for the app.
     * appId can be NO_APP_ID or a valid app id. appId should not be
     * UNKNOWN_APP_ID.
     * inMozBrowser has to be true if the app is inside a mozbrowser iframe.
     */
    AUTF8String getJarPrefix(in unsigned long appId, in boolean inMozBrowser);

    /**
     * Per-domain controls to enable and disable script. This system is designed
     * to be used by at most one consumer, and enforces this with its semantics.
     *
     * Initially, domainPolicyActive is false. When activateDomainPolicy() is
     * invoked, domainPolicyActive becomes true, and subsequent calls to
     * activateDomainPolicy() will fail until deactivate() is invoked on the
     * nsIDomainPolicy returned from activateDomainPolicy(). At this point,
     * domainPolicyActive becomes false again, and a new consumer may acquire
     * control of the system by invoking activateDomainPolicy().
     */
    nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicy();
    readonly attribute boolean domainPolicyActive;

    /**
     * Only the parent process can directly access domain policies, child
     * processes only have a read-only mirror to the one in the parent.
     * For child processes the mirror is updated via messages
     * and ContentChild will hold the DomainPolicy by calling
     * ActivateDomainPolicyInternal directly. New consumer to this
     * function should not be addded.
     */
    [noscript] nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicyInternal();

    /**
     * This function is for internal use only. Every time a child process is spawned, we
     * must clone any active domain policies in the parent to the new child.
     */
    [noscript, notxpcom] void cloneDomainPolicy(in DomainPolicyClonePtr aClone);

    /**
     * Query mechanism for the above policy.
     *
     * If domainPolicyEnabled is false, this simply returns the current value
     * of javascript.enabled. Otherwise, it returns the same value, but taking
     * the various blacklist/whitelist exceptions into account.
     */
    bool policyAllowsScript(in nsIURI aDomain);
};

%{C++
#define NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/scriptsecuritymanager;1"
%}