author Andrew Halberstadt <>
Fri, 21 Oct 2016 12:24:17 -0400
changeset 318984 85832226cbd70af940e2f093a28ebc9ec018fb48
parent 318517 86858f4eb39603554e24cad5e35ebf6953206b9d
child 319222 1fc115bbc7bebf25b9685dfff2f4a0c2ba9f9a11
permissions -rw-r--r--
Bug 1311723 - Look for mozinfo.json in the correct place when running interactive loaners, r=armenzg MozReview-Commit-ID: K8fqlo0x4Oc

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at */

#include "PostMessageEvent.h"

#include "MessageEvent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/BlobBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/File.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/FileList.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/FileListBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/MessageEventBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/MessagePort.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/MessagePortBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/PMessagePort.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/StructuredCloneTags.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/UnionConversions.h"
#include "mozilla/EventDispatcher.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsGlobalWindow.h"
#include "nsIPresShell.h"
#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsPresContext.h"
#include "nsQueryObject.h"

namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {

PostMessageEvent::PostMessageEvent(nsGlobalWindow* aSource,
                                   const nsAString& aCallerOrigin,
                                   nsGlobalWindow* aTargetWindow,
                                   nsIPrincipal* aProvidedPrincipal,
                                   nsIDocument* aSourceDocument,
                                   bool aTrustedCaller)
: StructuredCloneHolder(CloningSupported, TransferringSupported,


             "should have been passed an outer window!");
  MOZ_ASSERT(!mSource || mSource->IsOuterWindow(),
             "should have been passed an outer window!");

  // Note: We don't init this AutoJSAPI with targetWindow, because we do not
  // want exceptions during message deserialization to trigger error events on
  // targetWindow.
  AutoJSAPI jsapi;
  JSContext* cx =;

  // The document is just used for the principal mismatch error message below.
  // Use a stack variable so mSourceDocument is not held onto after this method
  // finishes, regardless of the method outcome.
  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> sourceDocument;

  // If we bailed before this point we're going to leak mMessage, but
  // that's probably better than crashing.

  RefPtr<nsGlobalWindow> targetWindow;
  if (mTargetWindow->IsClosedOrClosing() ||
      !(targetWindow = mTargetWindow->GetCurrentInnerWindowInternal()) ||
    return NS_OK;

             "we ordered an inner window!");
  JSAutoCompartment ac(cx, targetWindow->GetWrapper());

  // Ensure that any origin which might have been provided is the origin of this
  // window's document.  Note that we do this *now* instead of when postMessage
  // is called because the target window might have been navigated to a
  // different location between then and now.  If this check happened when
  // postMessage was called, it would be fairly easy for a malicious webpage to
  // intercept messages intended for another site by carefully timing navigation
  // of the target window so it changed location after postMessage but before
  // now.
  if (mProvidedPrincipal) {
    // Get the target's origin either from its principal or, in the case the
    // principal doesn't carry a URI (e.g. the system principal), the target's
    // document.
    nsIPrincipal* targetPrin = targetWindow->GetPrincipal();
    if (NS_WARN_IF(!targetPrin))
      return NS_OK;

    // Note: This is contrary to the spec with respect to file: URLs, which
    //       the spec groups into a single origin, but given we intentionally
    //       don't do that in other places it seems better to hold the line for
    //       now.  Long-term, we want HTML5 to address this so that we can
    //       be compliant while being safer.
    if (!targetPrin->Equals(mProvidedPrincipal)) {
      nsAutoString providedOrigin, targetOrigin;
      nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetUTFOrigin(targetPrin, targetOrigin);
      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
      rv = nsContentUtils::GetUTFOrigin(mProvidedPrincipal, providedOrigin);
      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);

      const char16_t* params[] = { providedOrigin.get(), targetOrigin.get() };

        NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DOM Window"), sourceDocument,
        params, ArrayLength(params));

      return NS_OK;

  ErrorResult rv;
  JS::Rooted<JS::Value> messageData(cx);
  nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = targetWindow->AsInner();

  Read(window, cx, &messageData, rv);
  if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
    return rv.StealNSResult();

  // Create the event
  nsCOMPtr<mozilla::dom::EventTarget> eventTarget = do_QueryObject(targetWindow);
  RefPtr<MessageEvent> event =
    new MessageEvent(eventTarget, nullptr, nullptr);

  Nullable<WindowProxyOrMessagePort> source;
  source.SetValue().SetAsWindowProxy() = mSource ? mSource->AsOuter() : nullptr;

  event->InitMessageEvent(nullptr, NS_LITERAL_STRING("message"),
                          false /*non-bubbling */, false /*cancelable */,
                          messageData, mCallerOrigin,
                          EmptyString(), source, nullptr);

  nsTArray<RefPtr<MessagePort>> ports = TakeTransferredPorts();

  // We can't simply call dispatchEvent on the window because doing so ends
  // up flipping the trusted bit on the event, and we don't want that to
  // happen because then untrusted content can call postMessage on a chrome
  // window if it can get a reference to it.

  nsIPresShell *shell = targetWindow->GetExtantDoc()->GetShell();
  RefPtr<nsPresContext> presContext;
  if (shell)
    presContext = shell->GetPresContext();

  WidgetEvent* internalEvent = event->WidgetEventPtr();

  nsEventStatus status = nsEventStatus_eIgnore;
  return NS_OK;

} // namespace dom
} // namespace mozilla