Bug 742434 - Part 1: Make ContentSecurityPolicy constructor explicit. r=gcp
authorJulian Hector <julian.r.hector@gmail.com>
Tue, 05 Jul 2016 03:07:00 +0200
changeset 303717 279d7b204e96
parent 303716 c676d55b6b00
child 303718 efc191826274
push id79150
push usergpascutto@mozilla.com
push date2016-07-05 18:15 +0000
treeherdermozilla-inbound@23140396a80e [default view] [failures only]
perfherder[talos] [build metrics] [platform microbench] (compared to previous push)
reviewersgcp
bugs742434
milestone50.0a1
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Bug 742434 - Part 1: Make ContentSecurityPolicy constructor explicit. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: HrBpcQ1BYFI
security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp
--- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp
+++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp
@@ -399,17 +399,17 @@ class ContentSandboxPolicy : public Sand
       return BlockedSyscallTrap(aArgs, nullptr);
     }
     return (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0
       ? broker->Stat(path, buf)
       : broker->LStat(path, buf);
   }
 
 public:
-  ContentSandboxPolicy(SandboxBrokerClient* aBroker):mBroker(aBroker) { }
+  explicit ContentSandboxPolicy(SandboxBrokerClient* aBroker):mBroker(aBroker) { }
   virtual ~ContentSandboxPolicy() { }
   virtual ResultExpr PrctlPolicy() const override {
     // Ideally this should be restricted to a whitelist, but content
     // uses enough things that it's not trivial to determine it.
     return Allow();
   }
   virtual Maybe<ResultExpr> EvaluateSocketCall(int aCall) const override {
     switch(aCall) {