author Nathan Froyd <>
Sun, 18 Oct 2015 01:24:48 -0400
changeset 268184 e8c7dfe727cd970e2c3294934e2927b14143c205
parent 266639 41dea9df27ed995f8315ab4318c187a617937664
child 282353 13d8daa68e2430f02c6a58042e439ea93d078160
permissions -rw-r--r--
Bug 1207245 - part 6 - rename nsRefPtr<T> to RefPtr<T>; r=ehsan; a=Tomcat The bulk of this commit was generated with a script, executed at the top level of a typical source code checkout. The only non-machine-generated part was modifying MFBT's to reflect the new naming. CLOSED TREE makes big refactorings like this a piece of cake. # The main substitution. find . -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.cc' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.mm' -o -name '*.idl'| \ xargs perl -p -i -e ' s/nsRefPtr\.h/RefPtr\.h/g; # handle includes s/nsRefPtr ?</RefPtr</g; # handle declarations and variables ' # Handle a special friend declaration in gfx/layers/AtomicRefCountedWithFinalize.h. perl -p -i -e 's/::nsRefPtr;/::RefPtr;/' gfx/layers/AtomicRefCountedWithFinalize.h # Handle nsRefPtr.h itself, a couple places that define constructors # from nsRefPtr, and code generators specially. We do this here, rather # than indiscriminantly s/nsRefPtr/RefPtr/, because that would rename # things like nsRefPtrHashtable. perl -p -i -e 's/nsRefPtr/RefPtr/g' \ mfbt/nsRefPtr.h \ xpcom/glue/nsCOMPtr.h \ xpcom/base/OwningNonNull.h \ ipc/ipdl/ipdl/ \ ipc/ipdl/ipdl/ \ dom/bindings/ \ python/lldbutils/lldbutils/ # In our indiscriminate substitution above, we renamed # nsRefPtrGetterAddRefs, the class behind getter_AddRefs. Fix that up. find . -name '*.cpp' -o -name '*.h' -o -name '*.idl' | \ xargs perl -p -i -e 's/nsRefPtrGetterAddRefs/RefPtrGetterAddRefs/g' if [ -d .git ]; then git mv mfbt/nsRefPtr.h mfbt/RefPtr.h else hg mv mfbt/nsRefPtr.h mfbt/RefPtr.h fi

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at */

#include "PostMessageEvent.h"

#include "MessageEvent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/BlobBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/File.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/FileList.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/FileListBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/MessagePort.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/MessagePortBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/PMessagePort.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/StructuredCloneTags.h"
#include "mozilla/EventDispatcher.h"
#include "nsGlobalWindow.h"
#include "nsIPresShell.h"
#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
#include "nsPresContext.h"

namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {

PostMessageEvent::PostMessageEvent(nsGlobalWindow* aSource,
                                   const nsAString& aCallerOrigin,
                                   nsGlobalWindow* aTargetWindow,
                                   nsIPrincipal* aProvidedPrincipal,
                                   bool aTrustedCaller)
: StructuredCloneHolder(CloningSupported, TransferringSupported,


             "should have been passed an outer window!");
  MOZ_ASSERT(!mSource || mSource->IsOuterWindow(),
             "should have been passed an outer window!");

  AutoJSAPI jsapi;
  JSContext* cx =;

  // If we bailed before this point we're going to leak mMessage, but
  // that's probably better than crashing.

  RefPtr<nsGlobalWindow> targetWindow;
  if (mTargetWindow->IsClosedOrClosing() ||
      !(targetWindow = mTargetWindow->GetCurrentInnerWindowInternal()) ||
    return NS_OK;

             "we ordered an inner window!");
  JSAutoCompartment ac(cx, targetWindow->GetWrapperPreserveColor());

  // Ensure that any origin which might have been provided is the origin of this
  // window's document.  Note that we do this *now* instead of when postMessage
  // is called because the target window might have been navigated to a
  // different location between then and now.  If this check happened when
  // postMessage was called, it would be fairly easy for a malicious webpage to
  // intercept messages intended for another site by carefully timing navigation
  // of the target window so it changed location after postMessage but before
  // now.
  if (mProvidedPrincipal) {
    // Get the target's origin either from its principal or, in the case the
    // principal doesn't carry a URI (e.g. the system principal), the target's
    // document.
    nsIPrincipal* targetPrin = targetWindow->GetPrincipal();
    if (NS_WARN_IF(!targetPrin))
      return NS_OK;

    // Note: This is contrary to the spec with respect to file: URLs, which
    //       the spec groups into a single origin, but given we intentionally
    //       don't do that in other places it seems better to hold the line for
    //       now.  Long-term, we want HTML5 to address this so that we can
    //       be compliant while being safer.
    if (!targetPrin->Equals(mProvidedPrincipal)) {
      return NS_OK;

  ErrorResult rv;
  JS::Rooted<JS::Value> messageData(cx);
  nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindow> window = targetWindow.get();

  Read(window, cx, &messageData, rv);
  if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
    return rv.StealNSResult();

  // Create the event
  nsCOMPtr<mozilla::dom::EventTarget> eventTarget =
  RefPtr<MessageEvent> event =
    new MessageEvent(eventTarget, nullptr, nullptr);

  event->InitMessageEvent(NS_LITERAL_STRING("message"), false /*non-bubbling */,
                          false /*cancelable */, messageData, mCallerOrigin,
                          EmptyString(), mSource);

  nsTArray<RefPtr<MessagePort>> ports = TakeTransferredPorts();

  event->SetPorts(new MessagePortList(static_cast<dom::Event*>(event.get()),

  // We can't simply call dispatchEvent on the window because doing so ends
  // up flipping the trusted bit on the event, and we don't want that to
  // happen because then untrusted content can call postMessage on a chrome
  // window if it can get a reference to it.

  nsIPresShell *shell = targetWindow->GetExtantDoc()->GetShell();
  RefPtr<nsPresContext> presContext;
  if (shell)
    presContext = shell->GetPresContext();

  WidgetEvent* internalEvent = event->GetInternalNSEvent();

  nsEventStatus status = nsEventStatus_eIgnore;
  return NS_OK;

} // namespace dom
} // namespace mozilla